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 I.  Abstract 
Nonmonotonic reasoning is a critical feature that 
robust reasoning systems must possess.  Another important 
feature that robust reasoning systems must possess is the 
ability to reason about collections of objects (i.e., sets.)  
Logic programming presents us with a very powerful 
paradigm within which to represent and reason about 
knowledge.  Developments in this field over recent years 
allow us to reason nonmonotonically, and allow us to reason 
about sets.  Of the semantics introduced over recent years to 
allow logic programs to reason about sets, Stable{} is the 
newest and most expressive (i.e., comprehensive) approach 
to date.  This paper examines the nonmonotonicity of 
Stable{}. 
 
 II.  Introduction 
Nonmonotonic reasoning is that ability humans possess 
which allow us to jump to conclusions which are not 
logically sound, but which nonetheless may be very 
reasonable.  What makes reasoning nonmonotonic is the 
ability to retract former conclusions in the light of new, 
contradictory information.  Both abilities are needed in order 
for automated reasoning systems to be robust:  the ability to 
jump to conclusions (even in the face of uncertain, distorted 
information), and the ability to Achange one=s mind@. 
Logic programming presents a very natural paradigm 
within which to represent and reason about knowledge.  
Much current research centers around extending the 
semantics of logic programming to allow us to reason more 
correctly (that is, to reason about new classes of problems.)  
With respect to extending the semantics, the semantics 
analyzed here allows us to reason about sets.  Granting 
intelligent systems the ability to reason about sets is an 
important feature, since we as humans commonly reason 
about collections of objects. 
The smallest piece of information in a logic program is 
an atom and is of the form 
 
P(t1, ..., tn)   
 
where P is an n-ary predicate constant , the ti  are terms,  n $ 
0.  Terms represent individual objects (concrete or abstract) 
that we care to reason about.  A predicate constant names a 
property or a relationship that exists among these objects.  
An example could be something such as  
 
married(john, mary, 1990, texas) 
 
which may represent something such as the fact that AJohn 
and Mary were married in Texas in 1990".  
A term is defined inductively as follows: 
1.  an object constant is a term 
2.  an object variable is a term. 
3.  if f is an n-ary function symbol and t1, ..., tn are 
terms, then f(t1, ..., tn) is a term. 
 
An example of an object constant would be something 
like john.  An example of an object variable would be 
something like AX@, as in Athere exists an X to whom John 
is married@ as in 
 
married(john, X). 
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An example of a functional expression would be 
something like Afirst_child_of(bill, hillary)@.  In this 
example (using the Clintons as an example), the functional 
expression is equivalent to the object constant chelsea.   
That is, the formula 
 
on_deans_list(chelsea) 
 
is equivalent to the formula 
 
on_deans_list(first_child_of(bill, hillary)) 
 
In practice, there is a special case of term type 3, used 
to represent a list, and is of the form: 
 
4.   if t1, ..., tn  n$0 are terms, then [t1, ..., tn] is a 
term.  
 
The purpose of the semantics analyzed in this paper is 
to introduce a new kind of term:  sets.  Such terms will be of 
the form:   
 
5.  if t1, ..., tn , n$0 are terms, then {t1, ..., tn} is a 
term. 
 
Notice that such an inductive definition of terms allows for 
arbitrarily complex terms. 
 III.  Definition of Stable{} 
Stable{} (Jones 97, Jones 99) is the newest among the 
few semantics that have been developed that allow one to 
reason about sets.  Future work will demonstrate that this 
semantics completely subsumes the other semantics, is more 
expressive than the other semantics, and is simpler than the 
other semantics.  Other work in progress also demonstrates 
that the level of nonmonotonicity within Stable{} is greater 
than that of other semantics.  (Space limitations preclude the 
proof of such claims here.) 
 
1.  Syntax 
Terms follow the standard definitions (as  outlined and 
enhanced in the introduction).  Formula also follow the 
standard definitions, with the addition that there are two pre-
defined forms:  if F(X¯) is a formula, then  
setof(q(X¯),F(X¯),Y)  
and  
5setof(q(X¯),F(X¯),Y)  
are formulae that can appear only in the bodies of rules  
where 
X¯  is an n-tuple of variables appearing in F(X¯), n$1 
q(X¯) and Y are arbitrary terms. 
 
2.  Semantics 
The semantics is defined with respect to entailment.  
This is the fundamental difference between our approach to 
a definition of semantics for sets, and other approaches.  
Further, our semantics clearly distinguishes between that 
which is entailed by a belief set, and that which is entailed 
by a program.  This is a crucial distinction, and one that is 
lacking in the other semantics. 
 
2.1  entailment with respect to a belief set 
Let P be an extended logic program with setof.  Let 
SfLit be a set of literals such that for every literal l 0 S 
appearing in a formula in P of the form setof or 5setof, the 
definition of l is finite. 
Definition:  Entailment w.r.t. S.  Let Q be some ground 
formula. 
case 1:  Q is of the form setof(q(X¯),F X¯(),Y).   S Ö 
Q iff Y is {q( t¯ ):  S Ö F( t¯ ) where q( t¯ )  is 
an arbitrary term formed from the tuple  
of ground terms which are among the 
ground terms appearing in F}. 
case 2:  Q is of the form 5setof(q(X¯),F(X¯),Y).  S Ö 
Q iff Y is not    {q( t¯ ):  S Ö F( t¯ ) where 
q( t¯ ) is an arbitrary term formed from the 
tuple  of ground terms which are among 
the ground terms appearing in F}. 
case 3:  Q is a literal.  S Ö Q iff Q 0 S. 
case 4:  Q is an extended literal, that is, of the form 
not P.  S Ö Q iff P ó S.  ~ 
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Definition:  S satisfies a rule iff for every formula F in the 
body of the rule, if S Ö F, then L, the head of the rule, is an 
element of S.  That is, L 0 S. 
Definition:  S is a belief set of P iff S is a minimal set 
satisfying all the rules of P. 
 
2.2  entailment with respect to a program 
Negation-as-failure creates the possibility that a 
program may have more than one belief set.  To distinguish 
between that which is entailed by a belief set, versus that 
which is entailed by all belief sets (that is, a program), we 
introduce the predicate symbol p_set_of  (which is of the 
same syntactical form as setof and is  introduced only as a 
convenience for the reader.)  
 
Definition:  Entailment w.r.t. P.  Let Q be some ground 
formula.  Let a(P) = {S: S is a belief set of P}.  
case 1:  Q is of the form p_set_of(q(X¯),F(X¯),Y).  P 
Ö Q iff Y is {q( t¯ ):  S Ö F( t¯ ) for all  S 0 
a(P ), where q( t¯ ) is an arbitrary term 
formed from the tuple t of ground terms 
appearing in F}. 
case 2: Q is of the form 5p_set_of(q(X¯),F(X¯),Y).  P 
Ö Q iff Y is not {q( t¯ ):  S Ö F( t¯ ) for all S 
0 a(P ), where q( t¯ ) is an arbitrary term 
formed from the tuple t of ground terms 
appearing in F}. 
case 3:  Q is a literal.  P Ö Q iff Q 0 S for all S 0 
a(P ). 
case 4:  Q is an extended literal, that is, of the form 
not P, where P is a ground literal.  P Ö Q 
iff P ó S for some S 0 a(P ). 
  ~ 
 
Definition: answers to queries.  Let Q be some sequence of 
ground formulae, q 0 Q be a ground formula.  For any such 
Q posed as a query to P, P answers yes iff P Ö q for all q 0 
Q, no iff P Ö 5q for some q 0 Q, and unknown otherwise.  
(That is, P Ö Q iff  P Ö q for all q 0 Q; P Ö 5Q iff  P Ö 5q 
for some q 0 Q; otherwise P  Q and P  5Q.) 
 
 IV.  Nonmonotonicity of Stable{} 
There are multiple forms of nonmonotonicity that 
Stable{} is capable of producing.  There is nonmonotonicity 
induced by negation-as-failure.  In the cases where 
inferences are made on the basis of missing information, as 
that missing information is added to our knowledge base, 
those previous inferences need to be withdrawn.  This same 
mechanism augmented by the ability to represent and reason 
about sets produces additional nonmonotonicity in that the 
intensional sets may differ with the addition of new 
information.  There are yet other forms of nonmonotonicity 
demonstrated by Stable{} which are not demonstrated by 
other semantics for sets.  These forms of nonmonotonicity 
are due to: 1)  the fact that Stable{} allows for multiple 
belief sets, 2) the fact that Stable{} allows more arbitrary 
intensional sets, and 3)  the fact that Stable{} distinguishes 
between that which is entailed by a belief set (i.e., local), 
and that which is entailed by a program (i.e., global).  With 
regard to point 2, Stable{} allows an unspecified level of 
nesting of intensional set definitions, it allows sets to be 
defined over a tuple of variables, and it allows negation-as-
failure as part of the intensional set definitions.  None of the 
other set semantics allow any of these features.  Length 
restrictions do not allow us to examine all these subtleties. 
 
Example 1 
This example demonstrates nonmonotonicity induced 
by negation-as-failure.   
 
r(a) 7 
p(X) 7 not q(X) 
 
Using the domain closure assumption (as will be used 
throughout this paper), the model for this program1 is {r(a), 
p(a)}.  Let us add the atom q(a) to our program.  The model 
for this modified program is {r(a), q(a)}.  The atom p(a) 
belongs to the model of the original program, but not to the 
model of the modified program.  Clearly, this is 
nonmonotonic behavior.  This is also very standard for logic 
programs, and is not unique to these semantics. 
  ~ 
There is yet a slight twist to the notion of 
nonmonotonicity that is induced by the construction of sets.  
Strictly speaking, it is still nonmonotonic behavior as before. 
 However, what is new is that the set that is constructed 
                                                 
1  In this paper, program, theory, and database 
are synonymous. 
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differs.  Without a semantics for sets, such a form of 
nonmonotonicity would not be possible. 
Example 2 
r(a) 7 
r(b) 7 
p(S) 7 setof(X, (r(X), not s(X)), S) 
 
A model for this program would be: {r(a), r(b), p({a, 
b}) }.  Let us add the atom s(b) to our program.  The model 
for our modified program is {r(a), r(b), p({a}), s(b)}.  The 
atom p({a, b}) belongs to the model of our original program, 
while the atom p({a}) belongs to the model of our modified 
program.  This again is nonmonotonic behavior.  The set 
that is entailed by the remainder of the program differs.  
Originally, the program entailedthe set {a, b}.  The modified 
program entails the set {a}.   ~ 
 
Example 3 
The semantics defines sets that are entailed by a belief 
set, and sets that are entailed by the program.  This 
distinction is important when there are multiple belief sets.  
This example demonstrates the nonmonotonicity induced by 
p_set_of.  Let P be the following program: 
 
p(a) 7 
p(b) 7 not p(c) 
p(c) 7 not p(b) 
p(d) 7 not p(e) 
This program has two belief sets: {p(a), p(b), p(d)} 
and {p(a), p(c), p(d)}.  Limiting p_set_of  to the language of 
the program, the only atoms entailed by this program are 
p(a), p(d), and p_set_of(X, p(X),{a, d}).  If we add the rule 
 
p(e) 7 not p(b) 
 
the program yields the two belief sets {p(a), p(b), p(d)} and 
{p(a), p(c), p(e)}.  Again, limiting p_set_of to the language 
of the program, the only atoms entailed by this program are 
p(a), and p_set_of(X, p(X),{a}).  Previous to the addition of 
this rule, the program entailed p(d).  Now, it no longer does. 
 Further, the set defined by p_set_of was previously {a, d}, 
whereas it is now {a}.  So, both the atoms that are inferred, 
and the intensional set have been reduced by new 
information.       ~ 
As an interesting aside, the addition of new 
information could reduce the number of belief sets.  While 
reducing the number of atoms entailed by the program 
would be considered nonmonotonic, reducing the number of 
belief sets is not considered so.  (In fact, the reduction of 
belief sets may be an increase in information.)  What is 
significant about this observation is that Stable{} could 
easily be extended to be based upon epistemic 
specifications.  Within the context of epistemic 
specifications (Baral, Gelfond 94) where modal operators 
allow one to reason among belief sets, it is quite possible 
that this very action could become nonmonotonic.  
Expanding Stable{} to the language of epistemic 
specifications is an area of future work.  The additional 
nonmonotonicity induced by epistemic specifications (in 
particular, as it relates to sets) is an area for further 
investigation.  The following example demonstrates the 
reduction in belief sets. 
 
Example 4 
Let P be the following program: 
p(a) 7 
p(b) 7 not p(c) 
p(c) 7 not p(b) 
 
This program has two belief sets: {p(a), p(b)} and 
{p(a), p(c)}.  Limiting p_set_of to the language of the 
program, the only atoms entailed by this program are 
p_set_of(X, p(X),{a}), and p(a).   If we add the atom p(b) to 
our program, we reduce the number of belief sets yielding 
only one belief set:  {p(a), p(b)}.~ 
Example 5 
This example demonstrates the nonmonotonicity 
induced by using negation-as-failure in the intensional set 
definition.  Let P be the following program: 
p(a) 7 
r(b) 7 
r(c) 7 
set(S) 7 setof(X, not p(X), S) 
 
The belief set for this program is {p(a), r(b), r(c), 
set({b, c}).  If we add the atom p(b) to our program, the 
belief set becomes {p(a), p(b), r(b), r(c), set({c}).  That is, 
the new information causes the atom set({b, c}) to no longer 
be entailed by the program, and it causes the set defined by 
the intensional definition to be different.  Similarly, the 
original program entailed p_set_of(X, not p(X), {b, c}), 
whereas the modified program entails p_set_of(X, not p(X), 
{c}).    ~ 
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Example 6 
This example produces the same results as does 
example 5 in the context of multiple belief sets.  Let our 
program be the following: 
 
p(a) 7 
r(b) 7 not r(c) 
r(c) 7 not r(b) 
set(S) 7 setof(X, not p(X), S) 
 
This program yields two belief sets: {p(a), r(b), set({b, 
c})} and {p(a), r(c), set({b, c})}.  If we add the rule p(b) 7 
not r(b), the resulting two belief sets are: {p(a), r(b), set({b, 
c})}, and {p(a), p(b), r(c), set({c})}.  The original program 
entailed set({b, c}) and p_set_of(X, not p(X), {b, c}), neither 
of which is entailed by the modified program.  There is not 
an atom with the predicate constant set entailed by the 
modified program (which differs from example 5), and yet it 
entails  p_set_of(X, not p(X), {c}). ~ 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The semantics presented here demonstrates 
nonmonotonic behavior in multiple fashion.  There is the 
nonmonotonicity induced by negation as failure.  There is 
the nonmonotonicity induced by intensional set terms.  This 
form of nonmonotonicity has at least two forms:  a set that is 
entailed by a program may no longer be entailed by the 
addition of new information, and the set that is entailed by 
the formulae can differ when adding new data to a program. 
 That is, at one level we have nonmonotonicity in the atoms 
that are entailed by a program, and (simultaneously) at 
another level we have nonmonotonicity in the set that is 
defined by the formulae.  That is, w.r.t. sets, there is 
nonmonotonicity induced by negation-as-failure, and 
nonmonotonicity induced by the intensional sets.  Further, 
there is the additional nonmonotonicity induced by the 
predicate p_set_of, since this predicate concerns itself with 
sets that are entailed by the program, rather than sets 
entailed by a particular belief set. A peculiar fact is that it is 
possible that with the introduction of a single fact, we may 
have nonmonotonic behavior (in that previously entailed 
formulae many no longer be entailed), and yet 
simultaneously, there is an increase in the information that is 
entailed by a program (in that the reduction of belief sets 
yields more facts that are entailed by the program.)  Many of 
these forms of nonmonotonicity are not present in other 
semantics for sets. 
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